macOS Dangerous Entitlements & TCC perms

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High

com.apple.rootless.install.heritable

The entitlement com.apple.rootless.install.heritable allows to bypass SIP. Check this for more info.

com.apple.rootless.install

The entitlement com.apple.rootless.install allows to bypass SIP. Check this for more info.

com.apple.system-task-ports (previously called task_for_pid-allow)

This entitlement allows to get the task port for any process, except the kernel. Check this for more info.

com.apple.security.get-task-allow

This entitlement allows other processes with the com.apple.security.cs.debugger entitlement to get the task port of the process run by the binary with this entitlement and inject code on it. Check this for more info.

com.apple.security.cs.debugger

Apps with the Debugging Tool Entitlement can call task_for_pid() to retrieve a valid task port for unsigned and third-party apps with the Get Task Allow entitlement set to true. However, even with the debugging tool entitlement, a debugger can’t get the task ports of processes that don’t have the Get Task Allow entitlement, and that are therefore protected by System Integrity Protection. Check this for more info.

com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation

This entitlement allows to load frameworks, plug-ins, or libraries without being either signed by Apple or signed with the same Team ID as the main executable, so an attacker could abuse some arbitrary library load to inject code. Check this for more info.

com.apple.private.security.clear-library-validation

This entitlement is very similar to com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation but instead of directly disabling library validation, it allows the process to call a csops system call to disable it.\
Check this for more info.

com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables

This entitlement allows to use DYLD environment variables that could be used to inject libraries and code. Check this for more info.

com.apple.private.tcc.manager or com.apple.rootless.storage.TCC

According to this blog and this blog, these entitlements allows to modify the TCC database.

system.install.apple-software and system.install.apple-software.standar-user

These entitlements allows to install software without asking for permissions to the user, which can be helpful for a privilege escalation.

com.apple.private.security.kext-management

Entitlement needed to ask the kernel to load a kernel extension.

com.apple.private.icloud-account-access

The entitlement com.apple.private.icloud-account-access it's possible to communicate with com.apple.iCloudHelper XPC service which will provide iCloud tokens.

iMovie and Garageband had this entitlement.

For more information about the exploit to get icloud tokens from that entitlement check the talk: #OBTS v5.0: "What Happens on your Mac, Stays on Apple's iCloud?!" - Wojciech Regula

com.apple.private.tcc.manager.check-by-audit-token

TODO: I don't know what this allows to do

com.apple.private.apfs.revert-to-snapshot

TODO: In this report is mentioned that this could be used to update the SSV-protected contents after a reboot. If you know how it send a PR please!

com.apple.private.apfs.create-sealed-snapshot

TODO: In this report is mentioned that this could be used to update the SSV-protected contents after a reboot. If you know how it send a PR please!

keychain-access-groups

This entitlement list keychain groups the application has access to:

<key>keychain-access-groups</key>
<array>
        <string>ichat</string>
        <string>apple</string>
        <string>appleaccount</string>
        <string>InternetAccounts</string>
        <string>IMCore</string>
</array>

kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles

Gives Full Disk Access permissions, one of the TCC highest permissions you can have.

kTCCServiceAppleEvents

Allows the app to send events to other applications that are commonly used for automating tasks. Controlling other apps, it can abuse the permissions granted to these other apps.

Like making them ask the user for its password:

osascript -e 'tell app "App Store" to activate' -e 'tell app "App Store" to activate' -e 'tell app "App Store" to display dialog "App Store requires your password to continue." & return & return default answer "" with icon 1 with hidden answer with title "App Store Alert"'

Or making them perform arbitrary actions.

kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient

Allows, among other permissions, to write the users TCC database.

kTCCServiceSystemPolicySysAdminFiles

Allows to change the NFSHomeDirectory attribute of a user that changes his home folder path and therefore allows to bypass TCC.

kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAppBundles

Allow to modify files inside apps bundle (inside app.app), which is disallowed by default.

It's possible to check who has this access in System Settings > Privacy & Security > App Management.

kTCCServiceAccessibility

The process will be able to abuse the macOS accessibility features, Which means that for example he will be able to press keystrokes. SO he could request access to control an app like Finder and approve the dialog with this permission.

Trustcache/CDhash related entitlements

There are some entitlements that could be used to bypass Trustcache/CDhash protections, which prevent the execution of downgraded versions of Apple binaries.

Medium

com.apple.security.cs.allow-jit

This entitlement allows to create memory that is writable and executable by passing the MAP_JIT flag to the mmap() system function. Check this for more info.

com.apple.security.cs.allow-unsigned-executable-memory

This entitlement allows to override or patch C code, use the long-deprecated NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory (which is fundamentally insecure), or use the DVDPlayback framework. Check this for more info.

com.apple.security.cs.disable-executable-page-protection

This entitlement allows to modify sections of its own executable files on disk to forcefully exit. Check this for more info.

com.apple.security.cs.allow-relative-library-loads

TODO

com.apple.private.nullfs_allow

This entitlement allows to mount a nullfs file system (forbidden by default). Tool: mount_nullfs.

kTCCServiceAll

According to this blogpost, this TCC permission usually found in the form:

[Key] com.apple.private.tcc.allow-prompting
    [Value]
        [Array]
            [String] kTCCServiceAll

Allow the process to ask for all the TCC permissions.

kTCCServicePostEvent

Allows injecting synthetic keyboard and mouse events system-wide via CGEventPost(). A process with this permission can simulate keystrokes, mouse clicks, and scroll events in any application — effectively providing remote control of the desktop.

This is especially dangerous combined with kTCCServiceAccessibility or kTCCServiceListenEvent, as it allows both reading AND injecting input.

// Inject a keystroke (Enter key)
CGEventRef keyDown = CGEventCreateKeyboardEvent(NULL, kVK_Return, true);
CGEventPost(kCGSessionEventTap, keyDown);

kTCCServiceListenEvent

Allows intercepting all keyboard and mouse events system-wide (input monitoring / keylogging). A process can register a CGEventTap to capture every keystroke typed in any application, including passwords, credit card numbers, and private messages.

For detailed exploitation techniques see:

{{#ref}}
macos-input-monitoring-screen-capture-accessibility.md
{{#endref}}

kTCCServiceScreenCapture

Allows reading the display buffer — taking screenshots and recording screen video of any application, including secure text fields. Combined with OCR, this can automatically extract passwords and sensitive data from the screen.

kTCCServiceCamera

Allows capturing photos and video from the built-in camera or connected USB cameras. Code injection into a camera-entitled binary enables silent visual surveillance.

kTCCServiceMicrophone

Allows recording audio from all input devices. Background daemons with mic access provide persistent ambient audio surveillance with no visible application window.

kTCCServiceLocation

Allows querying the device's physical location via Wi-Fi triangulation or Bluetooth beacons. Continuous monitoring reveals home/work addresses, travel patterns, and daily routines.

kTCCServiceAddressBook / kTCCServiceCalendar / kTCCServicePhotos

Access to Contacts (names, emails, phones — useful for spear-phishing), Calendar (meeting schedules, attendee lists), and Photos (personal photos, screenshots that may contain credentials, location metadata).

For complete credential theft exploitation techniques via TCC permissions, see:

{{#ref}}
macos-tcc/macos-tcc-credential-and-data-theft.md
{{#endref}}

Sandbox & Code Signing Entitlements

com.apple.security.temporary-exception.mach-lookup.global-name

Sandbox temporary exceptions weaken the App Sandbox by allowing communication with system-wide Mach/XPC services that the sandbox normally blocks. This is the primary sandbox escape primitive — a compromised sandboxed app can use mach-lookup exceptions to reach privileged daemons and exploit their XPC interfaces.

# Find apps with mach-lookup exceptions
find /Applications -name "*.app" -exec sh -c '
  binary="$1/Contents/MacOS/$(defaults read "$1/Contents/Info.plist" CFBundleExecutable 2>/dev/null)"
  [ -f "$binary" ] && codesign -d --entitlements - "$binary" 2>&1 | grep -q "mach-lookup" && echo "$(basename "$1")"
' _ {} \; 2>/dev/null

For detailed exploitation chain: sandboxed app → mach-lookup exception → vulnerable daemon → sandbox escape, see:

{{#ref}}
macos-code-signing-weaknesses-and-sandbox-escapes.md
{{#endref}}

com.apple.developer.driverkit

DriverKit entitlements allow user-space driver binaries to communicate directly with the kernel through IOKit interfaces. DriverKit binaries manage hardware: USB, Thunderbolt, PCIe, HID devices, audio, and networking.

Compromising a DriverKit binary enables:
- Kernel attack surface via malformed IOConnectCallMethod calls
- USB device spoofing (emulate keyboard for HID injection)
- DMA attacks through PCIe/Thunderbolt interfaces

# Find DriverKit binaries
find / -name "*.dext" -type d 2>/dev/null
systemextensionsctl list

For detailed IOKit/DriverKit exploitation, see:

{{#ref}}
../mac-os-architecture/macos-iokit.md
{{#endref}}

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