ImageMagick Security

Check further details in https://blog.doyensec.com/2023/01/10/imagemagick-security-policy-evaluator.html

ImageMagick is commonly used behind upload, thumbnailing, document-conversion, and CI/CD pipelines. That makes it a high-value target whenever untrusted images, SVGs, EPS, PS, or PDFs reach magick / convert.

Classic ImageTragick-style payloads are only part of the story. A modern chain can start from a single SVG and end in arbitrary file write by abusing how ImageMagick generates MVG plus how it delegates EPS/PS parsing to Ghostscript.

SVG -> MVG injection -> `msl:` execution

When ImageMagick rasterizes SVG, it first emits an intermediate MVG script. If attacker-controlled SVG data reaches that generated MVG without normalizing both LF and CR, an XML-encoded carriage return () can become a new MVG line.

A practical injection point is the <polyline points="..."> attribute because the points string is copied into MVG almost verbatim. A payload like:

<polyline points="0,0 50,50&#13;image Over 0,0 1,1 'msl:/tmp/payload.msl'&#13;100,0"/>

can turn one SVG attribute into attacker-controlled MVG commands.

The most useful primitive is:

image Over X,Y W,H 'URL'

This does not only load remote HTTP resources. It can also trigger internal coders / protocol handlers such as data: and msl:.

If msl: is reachable, an attacker can execute Magick Scripting Language from disk and turn the bug into arbitrary file write:



This is different from older ImageTragick payloads: instead of directly trying to get shell metacharacters into a delegate command, the chain abuses MVG line injection and then pivots into a second-stage MSL script.

Ghostscript delegate as the file dropper

ImageMagick usually sends EPS/PS/PDF work to a Ghostscript delegate. That matters even for an SVG upload, because injected MVG can load an embedded:

data:image/x-eps;base64,...

payload.

In the published ImagePanick repro, Ghostscript 10.06.0 running under SAFER can be abused as a file dropper:

.tempfile creates a writable temp file and also extends the read/write/control permit lists for that temp path.
writestring stores attacker-controlled MSL bytes.
renamefile moves the random temp name to a predictable filename such as /tmp/payload.msl.

Then a second injected MVG line loads:

msl:/tmp/payload.msl

and ImageMagick executes the MSL, producing arbitrary file write. From there, writing into a web root, cron path, shell init file, or authorized_keys is usually enough for practical RCE or persistence.

For more Ghostscript-centric notes, see Ghostscript Injection.

Quick triage

If a target processes untrusted images, first check which dangerous coders and delegates are still available:

magick -list policy
identify -list format | grep -E 'SVG|MSL|PS|EPS|PDF'
convert -list delegate | grep -iE 'gs|ghostscript'
find / -iname policy.xml 2>/dev/null

If the application accepts SVG and the backend simply does:

magick input.svg output.png

that alone may be enough to trigger the chain when weak policies and a Ghostscript delegate are present.

Towards Safer Policies

To address these challenges, a tool has been developed to aid in designing and auditing ImageMagick's security policies. This tool is rooted in extensive research and aims to ensure policies are not only robust but also free from loopholes that could be exploited.

Allowlist vs Denylist Approach

Historically, ImageMagick policies relied on a denylist approach, where specific coders were denied access. However, changes in ImageMagick 6.9.7-7 shifted this paradigm, enabling an allowlist approach. This approach first denies all coders and then selectively grants access to trusted ones, enhancing the security posture.

  ...
  <policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="*" />
  <policy domain="coder" rights="read | write" pattern="{GIF,JPEG,PNG,WEBP}" />
  ...

Case Sensitivity in Policies

It's crucial to note that policy patterns in ImageMagick are case sensitive. As such, ensuring that coders and modules are correctly upper-cased in policies is vital to prevent unintended permissions.

Resource Limits

ImageMagick is prone to denial of service attacks if not properly configured. Setting explicit resource limits in the policy is essential to prevent such vulnerabilities.

Policy Fragmentation

Policies may be fragmented across different ImageMagick installations, leading to potential conflicts or overrides. It's recommended to locate and verify the active policy files using commands like:

$ find / -iname policy.xml

A Starter, Restrictive Policy

A restrictive policy template has been proposed, focusing on stringent resource limitations and access controls. This template serves as a baseline for developing tailored policies that align with specific application requirements.

The effectiveness of a security policy can be confirmed using the identify -list policy command in ImageMagick. Additionally, the evaluator tool mentioned earlier can be used to refine the policy based on individual needs.

For untrusted uploads, prefer an allowlist. If SVG / EPS / PS are not required, explicitly block the dangerous coders instead of trying to blacklist individual bad payloads:

<policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="{SVG,EPS,PS,MSL}" />

Additional hardening:

Disable the Ghostscript delegate in delegates.xml if EPS / PS support is not needed.
Keep coder names upper-cased because policy patterns are case sensitive.
Prefer a dedicated SVG rasterizer such as librsvg for untrusted SVG instead of full ImageMagick + Ghostscript.
Run conversions in a sandbox (nsjail, firejail, container, read-only filesystem, restricted tmpdir).